Kehendak Bebas Dan Tanggung Jawab Moral: Rekonstruksi Komparatif Teologi Islam Dan Filsafat Barat Modern

Abstract

The relationship between human free will, divine sovereignty, natural causality, and moral responsibility remains a persistent problem in theology and philosophy. Classical Islamic debates formulated the issue through jabr, ikhtiyār, the creation of human acts, and kasb, whereas modern Western philosophy discussed it through determinism, autonomy, causality, and moral accountability. This article aims to reconstruct these two intellectual traditions within a shared analytical framework rather than merely juxtaposing doctrines. The study employs qualitative library research, comparative intellectual history, and thematic content analysis. Primary sources include representative works of al-Ash‘arī, ’Abd al-Jabbār, al-Bāqillānī, al-Ghazālī, Ibn Rushd, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Descartes, and Malebranche, supported by contemporary scholarship. Five indicators guide the comparison: the ontological source of action, the locus of agency, the relation between freedom and causality, the foundation of moral responsibility, and the treatment of constraints. The findings show that absolute determinism weakens the intelligibility of accountability, while absolute autonomy underestimates metaphysical, psychological, and social conditions. Mu‘tazilite voluntarism and Kantian autonomy strongly protect responsibility, whereas Ash‘arite kasb, Humean compatibilism, Ibn Rushd’s causal mediation, and Malebranche’s occasionalism offer different forms of reconciliation. The article proposes a “Layered Responsible Agency Model,” consisting of divine creatorship, human intentional appropriation, real but limited causal capacity, contextual constraint assessment, and proportional accountability. The model contributes a cross-traditional framework for interpreting moral agency in contemporary religious, legal, educational, and technological contexts.